The Imbalance of Nature

A lot of eco-thinking is based on the idea that there is a ‘balance of nature’. If only humanity could figure out how to play its part in that balance instead of jumping wildly on the far end of the scales, the argument goes, then we could assure our own future and that of our fellow organisms.

But is there really such a thing as a ‘balance of nature’? And if there isn’t, does that mean that anything goes as far as we humans are concerned, that we should consider ourselves a ‘God species’, to use Mark Lynas’s phrase, and not allow our horizons to be restricted by the irritating constraints of existing biology?

My answers to those two questions are ‘no’ and ‘no’, and here I’ll briefly attempt to explain why.

There seem to be three distinct levels at which the ‘balance of nature’ is usually invoked – the whole earth system, individual ecosystems and inter/intra-species relationships. At the whole earth system level, the key idea is James Lovelock’s famous ‘Gaia’ theory, which proposes that the Earth is a self-regulating or homeostatic system with a goal – the regulation of surface conditions so as always to be as favourable as possible for contemporary life (Lovelock The Revenge of Gaia, p.208). The problem is right there in that sentence. For it’s one thing to posit homeostasis, and quite another to posit goals. A thermostatically controlled heating system is self-regulating but, unlike its designer, it is not a conscious agent with specific ‘goals’, and there are any number of reasons why the switch may suddenly be flipped. So I’d argue that at the earth systems level forces may exist that tend to conserve various planetary conditions, but this implies no ultimate direction towards a balanced end-state. Lovelock frequently talks about Gaia in the third person as if she is a goal-oriented agent, but he also says that he finds it useful to think of the Earth only as being like an animal, that Gaia is mere metaphor (The Revenge of Gaia, p.20). I don’t think he can have it both ways. If Gaia is mere metaphor (and I can’t see any evidence to suggest otherwise) then the ‘balance of nature’ is at best contingent and provisional, not intrinsic. There are no goals, and no reason to suppose that something won’t come along to switch the celestial heating system on or off. If Gaia truly exists, she must be some kind of mad, amoral scientist, hurling endless germplasm into an indifferent world, throwing curveball after curveball at it (or, being English, perhaps I should say googly after googly), and giggling as she watches whether it can cope. On reflection, I reckon she’s probably a man.

At the ecosystem level, I think we tend to overestimate natural balance partly because our short lifespan makes us perceive stability where ultimately there is none, and partly because we humans have largely succeeded in extracting ourselves from specific actual ecosystems. If we go for a hike in the woods it’s easy to marvel at the natural balance of the biota surrounding us, but ‘natural balance’ may not be the best descriptor for the relationships between actual organisms fighting their numerous battles for position in the woodland, except as an ex post facto description of the outcome of those battles. Similar arguments apply to natural succession. It’s tempting, for example, to think that nitrogen-fixing pioneer species work collaboratively with successor species to enrich the overall environment (with alder playing John the Baptist to the oak tree’s Jesus, for example), but biological research suggest that the priority has more to do with the superior colonizing strategies of the pioneer plants than of any necessary relationship between the two (Begon et al, Ecology, p.481-2). And the boundaries of ecosystems are never rigid, always in flux, always exchanging energy or other inputs at the margins…

At the inter/intra-species level – well, after many years of Social Darwinism proclaiming the competitive struggle for existence, red in tooth and claw, that now all looks rather more like the self-image of an aggressively expanding colonial society than anything deeply grounded in empirical science. But by the same token the stories we now often like to tell ourselves of biological coexistence and cooperation may reveal more about our own modern preconceptions than anything about the world beyond our window (indeed, coexistence can result from what ecologists call the ‘ghost of competition past’ and even genuine symbiosis in nature often turns out to be at another organism’s expense, such as the conspiracy against giraffes worked by acacias and ants). All in all, I suspect that anybody choosing to pin their colours to a particular point on the continuum between savage competition and blissful harmony as a description of biological process is as right, and as wrong, as anybody choosing an entirely different point. Better, I think, not to choose a point at all.

So if there is no real ‘balance’ in nature, does that mean that we humans should feel free to mess with it however we please? I’d like to answer ‘no’, and here’s why. Environmental philosophers have long attempted to show that living things have ‘intrinsic value’ aside from the values that humans place upon them. I don’t think they’ve succeeded, which in some ways I find regrettable but in others a relief, since the biocentric nature ethics of somebody like Paul Taylor puts you in a serious quandary about whether it’s ethically acceptable to actually eat. To be honest, I’m no longer terribly interested in debating the finer philosophical points of such analyses, but I find the writings of Aldo Leopold (eg. ‘The land ethic’ in his book A Sand County Almanac) and his latter day interpreters like J. Baird Callicott (eg. Beyond The Land Ethic) instructive. I’d offer the following brief encapsulation of their arguments in layman’s language: the natural world is complex, humans don’t understand all that much about it, and we gain when we try as much as possible to empathise with and learn from others rather than subordinating them to ourselves (which needn’t imply that we can’t eat them). Or, as Callicott puts it, “A thing is right when it tends to disturb the biotic community only at normal spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Beyond The Land Ethic, p.138).

So if as a farmer I grow cabbages, like all other organisms I inevitably intervene in the biotic community and try to turn some of its resources to my own ends. My activities will be of great interest to others in the biotic community, such as cabbage white butterflies, who will do likewise. I could ignore them, and eat whatever remains of my holey, caterpillar-shit encrusted cabbages. Or I could make further interventions in the biotic community: I could cover my cabbages with enviromesh in a (usually fruitless, in my experience) attempt to stop the butterflies entering; I could plant lovage and yarrow nearby to encourage parasitic wasps to come along and lay their eggs inside the caterpillars until they’re eaten from inside out by the wasp larvae; I could spray the cabbages with a Bacillus thuringiensis preparation, or with pyrethrum; or perhaps I could plant transgenic cabbages with Bt toxin engineered into the genome.

All of these strategies make a determinate intervention in nature, and all will have many biotic consequences cascading down the succeeding generations, but if there is no ‘natural balance’ to which any of them converges which of them should I adopt? Going back to the land ethic and Callicott’s summary of it, I feel most comfortable with the ones somewhere in the middle of the list – ones which I suspect also score on grounds of long-term human self-interest, though sadly not short-term profit. Those middle strategies also appeal to me because I think they probably strike more of a balance between my ends and those of other members of the biotic community. For if ultimately there is no balance in nature, perhaps there’s something to be said for finding a balance in ourselves.

Back to the future

There’s more to be said about the ecological side of gardens, forest gardens and Clifford Geertz as per my previous post, but I’ll leave that for another time. Here I want to pick up on some of the economic implications of Geertz’s analysis, again on the basis that what he has to say about the Indonesian past may prove strangely relevant to the UK future.

Geertz’s concept of ‘agricultural involution’ refers to the situation in colonial Indonesia where the marginal labour productivity of sawah (see previous post if that phrase makes no sense) enabled a growing peasant population to take care of its basic subsistence needs enduringly, if barely adequately. Extra peasant labour squeezed more subsistence out of a given area of land, but without producing an additional surplus. With subsistence needs (just) met, the Dutch colonial authorities were then able to apply additional surplus-generating activities in the form of sugar cane – a cash crop that was grown in rotation with rice – and extract the proceeds. (Interestingly, the swidden cultivators did much better under the colonial regime than the sawah peasants through the former’s ability to grow coffee as a cash crop, but that’s another story). Geertz describes the resulting ‘involuted’ wet-rice peasant villages as ‘post-traditional’: “large, dense, vague, dispirited communities – the raw material of a nonindustrialized mass society”, which experienced the worst of two possible worlds, “a static economy and a burgeoning population”.

To me, that doesn’t sound a whole lot different from where many countries (including the UK) are now placed, or soon will be. Of course, we have a much more technological agriculture, and an industrial sector that historically absorbed most of our peasant refugees from a labour-shedding and capital-intensifying agriculture. In 1963, when Agricultural Involution was published, this genuinely seemed an attractive development path, and Geertz spends some time analysing the way that Japan overcame Indonesian-style involution by keeping western colonialism at bay, using peasant surplus to seed a nascent industrial sector, and then feeding some of the industrial surplus back into agriculture to increase per capita productivity, for example through providing synthetic fertilisers and the like. So in this view, in terms of marginal labour productivity, industrial agriculture is to sawah what sawah is to swidden.

But from the perspective of 2012, as far as I can see this industrialisation of agriculture has probably only bought a few generations of prosperity before landing most of us back with involution – this time in the form of moribund industrial and agro-industrial sectors, which at best will struggle to match the demands upon their productivity in the coming years, and at worst will fail dramatically to do so. That is, unless all the current deficit-slashing and export-boosting government policies we’re suffering at the moment do somehow manage to reboot the economy, including the agricultural economy (‘fat chance’, as Colin Hines argues convincingly in this interesting analysis of our misplaced obsession with free trade).

So perhaps we too will face a potentially involuted future scenario of spiralling energy prices, dense population, a dwindling and moribund industrial sector and a whole lot of neo-peasants trying to make ends meet on small-scale farms. The way that scenario will play out depends a lot on the balance of political and economic power between landowners and cultivators – which in fact has been a key force in the history of virtually everywhere since probably as far back as the Neolithic Revolution, until our brief modern interlude of merchants and moneymen. But it’s usually been a story of exploited and increasingly landless peasant labour under the thumb of landed gentries. This is why Marxists don’t have much time for peasantries as political actors, because they think that ‘the peasantry’ inevitably turns into two classes – the ‘upper peasantry’ joining the ranks of the gentry, and the ‘lower peasantry’ becoming a landless proletariat, which Marxists can then fit comfortably into their familiar schema of class struggle (Tom Brass’s book Peasants, Populism and Postmodernism is a good illustration of the genre).

There’s no doubt that that scenario has indeed played out many times historically. But are there situations where peasants – small-scale cultivators – retain their equilibrium? A.V. Chayanov argued that the Russian peasantry was one such case, before Stalin had him murdered for his unbecoming lack of Marxist orthodoxy. And Geertz argues that the Indonesian peasantry was another one: “under the pressure of increasing numbers and limited resources Javanese village society did not bifurcate…Rather it maintained a comparatively high degree of social and economic homogeneity by dividing the economic pie into a steadily increasing number of minute pieces…Rather than haves and have-nots, there were…“just enoughs” and “not-quite-enoughs”” (p.97).

Geertz shows that the way this happened centred less on landownership than on land-working, with an extraordinarily complex set of arrangements by which people agreed who would work which land – often leasing out parts of their own land and taking on leases with somebody else’s in order to optimise subsistence requirements with family employment. To the modern agricultural mind it all looks hopelessly inefficient and piecemeal. But to a mind attentive to micro-climate, ecological niche, energy constraint and preserving agrarian livelihood it looks like a model that might repay further study, for it’s a road we may soon be travelling ourselves.

It seems to me that if we are to create an agrarian society that can ride future environmental shocks and still prosper, it will probably have to be one of “just-enough-and-then-a-little-bit-mores”. In other words, it will need to create a surplus that, instead of being exported as with the Dutch colonists in Indonesia – is appropriately reinvested into agrarian society itself, for example in health care, education, social security and in appropriate agricultural investment. But it will have to keep the surplus under control to avoid the kind of spiralling economic and ecological rent that disfigures our contemporary global society with its ecocide and its extremes of wealth and poverty. To do so, it will have to place a lot of emphasis on ‘just enough’ and avoid the all too common bifurcation of cultivators into the haves and have nots, which again will ultimately fuel spiralling economic and ecological rent. There’s a fine line to tread between involution, labour coercion and unsustainable ‘development’, and it’s not immediately obvious to me how our present society, with all its screaming inequality and short-term rent-seeking, could generate such a sage and just successor society. But it’s something I’d like to consider further, against the backdrop of other agrarian societies that have made some progress down this path. And if anyone has any ideas…